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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a professional American athlete. After being named the top
collegiate player for your sport in your state, conference, and the country, you lead your team
to a national championship title. Shortly after your graduation, you represent your country at
the Olympics, where you help secure a gold medal win. You return to the Olympics four
years later and take home bronze. When talks about founding a professional league for your
sport begin, you are quickly approached to help establish the new league and are slated to be
one of its top players. Throughout your seven seasons in the newly founded league, you start
in 220 straight games, make four championship appearances, are named a league All-Star
five times, and are twice named Defensive Player of the Year. After an illustrious collegiate
and professional career that spans two decades, the most you can hope to earn a season is
$87,000. While this is certainly higher than the average American's annual income, it is
considerably low for a professional athlete in the United States. In this case, you are not just
any professional athlete, but NCAA Champion, U.S. Olympian, and Women's Basketball
Hall of Famer, Teresa Weatherspoon.
Weatherspoon joined the Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) for its
inaugural year in 1997. During her senior season at Louisiana Tech University in 1988, she
helped secure a national championship title for the Lady Techsters and was named the
Louisiana Player of the Year, the American South Conference Player of the Year, a Kodak
All-American, the Wade Trophy winner for the best women’s basketball player in National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I competition, and the Broderick Cup’s
Outstanding Woman Athlete of the Year. After her graduation from Louisiana Tech,
Weatherspoon was named to the NCAA Women’s Basketball Team of the Decade. She was
1

also named to the U.S. Olympic women’s basketball team in 1988 and 1992, in which the
U.S. took home the gold and bronze. 1
At the time of Weatherspoon’s graduation from Louisiana Tech, there was no
professional women‘s basketball league in the United States. Weatherspoon played eight
seasons abroad–six seasons in Italy and two in Russia–before being approached about
joining the WNBA for its first season in 1997. After spending six storied seasons with the
New York Liberty and a final season with the Los Angeles Sparks, Weatherspoon retired
in 2004. That year, the WNBA’s salary cap for a veteran with a minimum of six seasons of
play, was $87,000, 2 while rookies in the National Basketball Association (NBA),
America's professional men's basketball league, were guaranteed a minimum of
$385,277. 3 A decade after Weatherspoon's retirement, a six-season veteran of the WNBA
can make, at most, $107,500 4 a season; the minimum for a rookie in the NBA is
$507,336. 5 Using the WNBA‘s New York Liberty and NBA‘s New York Knicks as cases
in point, this thesis investigates and discusses the causes and implications of this profound
pay inequity.
The WNBA is the longest running professional league for a women’s team sport in
American history. This longevity can be attributed to the WNBA’s financial backing by
the NBA and the corporate and television partnerships the league has obtained in recent
years. Because of the NBA’s ownership of the WNBA, WNBA games are played in some
of the most renowned arenas in the world, including Madison Square Garden in
Manhattan, the Staples Center in Los Angeles, the Phillips Arena in Atlanta, and the
1

WNBA. “Playerfile: Teresa Weatherspoon ,”WNBA.com, n.d.
<http://origin.wnba.com/playerfile/teresa_weatherspoon/bio.html> (accessed May 2, 2015).
2
See WNBPA, “WNBA Collective Bargaining Agreement,” December 1999.
3
See NBPA, “NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement,” December 2001.
4
See WNBPA, “WNBA Collective Bargaining Agreement,” December 2014.
5
See NBPA , “NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement,” December 2011.
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Verizon Center in Washington, D.C. In August 2011, the WNBA signed the most lucrative
sponsorship deal in the league’s history with pay-as-you-go cell phone provider, Boost
Mobile, a subsidiary of Sprint. While the WNBA and Boost did not disclose the deal’s
worth, the company is the league’s sole marquee sponsor, sponsoring the WNBA Playoffs
and Finals, and having its logo on eleven of the league’s thirteen teams’ jerseys, courts,
and arenas. 6 In 2013, the WNBA signed a six year contract extension with ESPN. Valued
at $12 million a season, ESPN will televise thirty of the WNBA’s 208 games. 7 Business
ventures like these have allowed the league to supplement their revenue and establish more
platforms for the league and its players.
Despite the gains of the WNBA, however, professional sports in America continue
to be plagued by gender inequity that can be seen at all levels of professional women
athletes’ careers. The pay gap that exists between players in the WNBA and NBA is not
unique to professional basketball. Instead, most professional women’s athletes earn only a
fraction of their male counterparts. The total prize money for the Professional Golf
Association’s (PGA) 2014 tour was over $340 million, while the total prizes in the Ladies’
Professional Golf Association (LGPA) amounted to less than one-fifth of that, at $61.6
million.8 Similarly, the 2015 Women's World Cup Champions, the U.S. Women’s National
Soccer Team (USWNT) were awarded $2 million, while Germany’s men’s team took
home $35 million for winning the men’s tournament in 2014. The U.S. Men’s National
Team (USMNT), finishing in eleventh place, collected $9 million, while each men’s team
that was eliminated in the first round of the 2014 World Cup got $8 million each (four
6

USA Today Sports, “ESPN and WNBA work out broadcast deal.” USAToday.com. Mar. 28, 2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/wnba/2013/03/28/wnba-espn-abc-new-deal/2028977/ (accessed May 2, 2015).
7
Ibid.
8
Women’s Sports Foundation, “Pay Inequity in Athletics,” Equity Issues, nd.
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/en/home/research/articles-and-reports/equity-issues/pay-inequity (accessed 17
Jan. 2016).
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times as much as the 2015 women’s championship team). 9 Forty-three years after the
infamous “Battle of the Sexes” in tennis between Billie Jean King and Bobby Riggs,
women of the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) make an estimated twenty-five percent
less than their male counterparts. On the international circuit in 2007, Wimbledon
organizers declared that equal prizes would be awarded for the winners of their men’s and
women’s tournaments, over 120 years after the Ladies’ Championship was first introduced
at Wimbledon in 1884. 10
This gendered wage gap only further separates men’s and women’s professional
athletes and parallels the historical practice of pay inequity in the United States. Today,
fifty-two years after the passage of the Equal Pay Act in 1963, pay inequity still adversely
affects the socioeconomic well-being of American women. The causes of this wage
inequality and, in some cases, its very existence are highly contested by scholars and
legislators, 11 despite the growing amount of scholarship that concludes a gendered pay
gap exists in nearly all sectors of the American workforce. This thesis adds to this
scholarship, showing that the extent of pay inequity is such that it reaches beyond
traditional workplaces and into professional sports. Drawing on sports marketing and
management scholarship, history, and feminist theory, this interdisciplinary investigation
considers the ways in which gender norms affect the construction of consumer markets
for professional sports and, in turn, the labor markets that determine players’ pay. Using
the WNBA’s New York Liberty and NBA’s New York Knicks as cases in point, this
9

Ibid.
Ibid.

10
11

See Denise Venable, "The Wage Gap Myth," National Center for Policy Analysis. No. 392. (2002):1-2, ncpa.org, 15
Sept. 2015. <http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba392>; Travis Waldron, “Wisconsin State Senator Says Women are Paid Less
‘Because Money is Less Important to Women,’” Think Progress. (2012) thinkprogress.org, 30 Oct. 2015.
<http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/04/09/460917/wisconsin-state-senator-money-less-important-wome/>; and
Carrie Lukas, “It‘s Time That We End the Equal Pay Myth,” Forbes. (2012) forbes.com, 30 Oct. 2015.
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/04/16/its-time-that-we-end-the-equal-pay-myth/>

4

research is chiefly concerned with analyzing the importance of marketing for league and
player success and the ways in which these marketing efforts rely on or resist gender
stereotypes.
A multitude of reasons are cited as the causes of pay inequity between professional
men and women athletes, but most suggest that fans and sponsors are less interested in the
women. Because of this lack of corporate and consumer support, women’s leagues do not
generate as much revenue as their male counterparts, making their players’ lower wages
not only inevitable, but also, according to some observers, fair. As The Daily Beast’s
Lizzie Crocker argues, “the sports gap isn’t a big, sexist conspiracy. In the current
economic environment, it’s not at all unfair that female athletes make less than their male
counterparts. It’s simply a matter of supply and demand.” 12 What Crocker and those who
share her thoughts on the issue ignore are the causes of this lack of demand. As this thesis
reveals, while the pay gap in professional sports may not be “a big sexist conspiracy,” the
ideologies that surround women in sports and the marketing of their professional leagues
certainly have the makings of one.
While instances of pay disparity can be found throughout professional sports, the
WNBA’s ownership by the NBA makes professional basketball a model case study.
Because WNBA and NBA teams share the same arenas, represent the same cities, and are
marketed to the same regional fan bases, one could expect the leagues to market their
teams in similar ways, specifically through an appeal to hometown pride. However, this is
not the case. Instead, there are distinct differences in the ways these leagues are marketed
which, I argue, are dependent on traditional ideologies of gender. Through an analysis of
12
Lizzie Crocker, “Stop Moaning About Women’s Soccer Pay,” thedailybeast.com, Jul. 10, 2015
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/10/are-women-soccer-players-close-to-scoring-equal-pay.html (accessed
Apr. 20, 2016)
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league and team promotional materials, commercials, and player interviews, I show that
the marketing narrative established by the WNBA is one that largely promotes its players
in traditionally feminine roles. This, in turn, has been detrimental to the success of the
league. As I argue, the WNBA’s preoccupation with gender norms, as opposed to player
ability, is a chief factor limiting the league’s appeal to larger fan bases, helping to
maintain the deep disparity in pay between the WNBA and NBA.
In Complex Inequality: Gender, Class and Race in the New Economy (2001), 13
sociologist Leslie McCall argues that the call for comparative worth— the idea that
different work of equal value warrants equal pay― is no longer an appropriate device for
remedying economic inequities. Throughout the book, McCall discusses how
stereotypical ideals of gender have allowed the pay gap to remain and argues that the
workplace for women is defined not just by pay inequality between men and women, but
also by pay inequality between groups of women. Using case studies of economic
conditions of women in Dallas, Detroit, Miami, and St. Louis, McCall argues that
women’s economic inequality in the United States varies “considerably and
systematically” 14 across the lines of race, class, education, and region. She argues that
there is no universal policy that will end the problem of economic inequality, as even the
best-intentioned models, such as comparable worth, have the tendency to become
racialized and classist, making them ineffective in a changing economic landscape.
Instead, McCall argues, closing the wage gap requires constant consideration of
intersectional identities and a reinvigorated investigation of the sources of old and new
forms of pay inequity.

13
14

Leslie McCall, Complex Inequality: Gender, Class and Race in the New Economy (UK: Taylor and Francis Group, 2001)
Ibid., 117.
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Steven Peter Vallas argues that work and wages are not only a product of the
marketplace, but also a social and political construct in his book, Work: A Critique
(2012). 15 Vallas argues that understanding inequalities requires not only a consideration of
the structure of work, but also emphasis on the social and cultural forces that shape and
define the “appropriate types of people who ‘should’ be channeled into particular
jobs.” 16Discussing the lasting effects of two broad and overlapping cultural ideologies—the
idea of “True Womanhood” and the “cult of domesticity”— he offers that the ideal of a
subservient, dependent woman first inspired the division of labor between women and men
that still persists today as a major cause of pay inequity.
In A Woman’s Wage: Historical Meanings & Social Consequences (2014), 17
historian Alice Kessler-Harris analyzes the power of the cultural construction of pay in
America and explores the various meanings of a “woman‘s wage.” She writes that the
slogan “Equal Pay for Equal Work” has been used by women‘s groups since the end of the
nineteenth century, and its continued use speaks not to the popularity of the phrase, but to
the persistence of the issue of pay inequity. Through an analysis of various sources,
including letters sent by women workers to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, the 1986 Supreme Court case Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Sears, Roebuck and Company, a study of the implications of the 2007 recession, and Sheryl
Sandberg‘s book, Lean In (2013), Kessler- Harris presents a compelling updated version of
her 1990 edition of the book. Echoing McCall‘s Complex Inequality, she argues that the
idea of a universal experience of womanhood prevents us from seeing the complex effects

15

Steven Peter Vallas, Work: A Critique (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012).
Ibid., 87
17
Alice Kessler-Harris, A Woman’s Wage: Historical Meanings & Social Consequences (Lexington, KY: University Press
of Kentucky, 2014, 1990).
16
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of pay inequity on women from varying intersectional identities. Kessler-Harris continues,
arguing that giving focus to the “top of the pay and education ladders” 18 defines an
acceptable wage for women as one that rewards women whose behavior is most like that of
successful men, rather than achieving a gender- neutral market wage. Kessler-Harris
concludes that establishing a “truly equal wage” 19 requires an extensive examination and
reappraisal of our cultural institutions and values.
The work of McCall, Vallas, and Kessler-Harris represents the conversation this
thesis enters, as all demonstrate that pay inequality is not the result of lower skill levels or
productivity amongst women, but is instead the result of hegemonically and systemically
imposed ideologies of gender. As Teresa Weatherspoon’s exemplary career makes clear,
her earning one-fourth (if not less) of her male counterparts' salary does not reflect her
ability or skill as a basketball player, but instead exemplifies the effects on pay of
traditional views of gender.
The most significant contribution of this thesis to the debate on pay inequity is its
focus on the effects of gender ideologies on the creation and structuring of consumer
markets and, subsequently, labor markets. While scholars on pay inequity foreground
gender in their investigations of inequities in hiring and pay practices, they routinely treat
the labor market as a pre-existing, static entity, and do not analyze how the ideologies
held by those who compose the market—employers, employees, consumers, and so on —
figure into its construction. Kessler-Harris does note that, through studying women’s
participation in the workplace, it is clear that the labor market is “socially, not abstractly,

18
19

Ibid., 140.
Ibid., 141.
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constructed,” 20 but does not offer specific examples of this. Focusing on how gender
ideologies shape labor and consumer markets in profession basketball, my research offers
new ways to think about pay inequity and its implications.
Chapter One, “How the NBA Came to Control Professional Women’s Basketball
in the United States,” outlines the history of professional women’s basketball in America
and the WNBA’s relationship with the NBA. By considering the professional leagues
that preceded the WNBA, I discuss the importance of the NBA’s sponsorship of the
WNBA during the league’s early years. I analyze the ways in which the NBA’s
ownership of the WNBA has now become obstructive towards the WNBA’s success, and
argue that this relationship has caused the WNBA to become limited in status as a “niche”
sport.
In “The Family-Friendly Ladies of the WNBA,” I use marketing and media
materials— ranging from print ads and television commercials—to discuss the ways in
which the WNBA and New York Liberty markets have been created. I assess the
implications of how the “value” of WNBA players is constructed and presented to
consumers, and argue that these narratives depend on and further perpetuate hegemonic
views of gender. Consequently, the scope of the WNBA’s reach to general audiences is
limited which, in turn, limits the WNBA and its teams’ ability to create sustainable,
revenue-generating markets. Because of this, the league has become unable to able to
offer to players competitive salaries.
Finally, in the third chapter, ‘“Spin Moves’: The Marketing Maneuvers of the
WNBA,” I discuss the ways that the WNBA has been able to “spin” some of the biggest
issues the league faces into causes for celebration—the growing trend of WNBA players
20

Kessler-Harris, 113.

9

competing overseas in the off-season in order to supplement the low wages and the league’s
resistance towards embracing its LGBT fan base. I argue that these marketing efforts only
further reveal the league’s struggle to attract and maintain sustainable fan bases, and suggest
that the league is more committed to the projected image of its players than their actual
personal and financial well-being.
This research further demonstrates the importance of marketing for league and
player success in professional sports, and allows for new understandings of the
relationship between marketing, fan perception, and league sustainability. It also provides
new ways of understanding pay inequity in broader contexts, as it considers the role of
consumer marketing and ideologies in the structuring of labor and wages.

10

CHAPTER ONE
How the NBA Came to Control Professional Women’s Basketball in the United States
In the forty years since the passage of Title IX, more American women have played
basketball than any other sport. 21 Women’s intercollegiate basketball is among the most
celebrated women’s sports in the United States today, with 2015 being the eighth consecutive
season in which over eleven million fans were in attendance at NCAA women’s basketball
games. 22 Since the 2000 season, no fewer than 18,000 fans have been in attendance at each
day of the women’s Final Four tournament. 23 Storied programs such as the Baylor Lady
Bears and Notre Dame Fighting Irish outdraw their male counterparts in home game
attendance 24 and a reported twenty-one women’s teams generate more basketball revenue
than their school’s men’s squads. 25 Women’s collegiate basketball created an arena in which
professional-caliber players emerged and, with such growing visibility and support, the
creation of a professional women’s league was considered the natural next step for the sport
in the late 1970s. However, it would take over twenty-five years after Title IX's passage for
the United States to see a professional women's basketball league that lasted longer than
three seasons. Nearing the tip-off of its twentieth season, the WNBA is the longest running
American professional women's basketball league to date. It was preceded by four attempted
professional women's basketball leagues in the United States: the Women's Professional
Basketball League (1978-1981), the Liberty Basketball Association (1991), the Women's
21

Pamela Grundy and Susan Shackelford, Shattering the Glass: The Remarkable History of Women’s Basketball. (New
York: The New Press, 2007), 1.
22
NCAA, “Women's basketball attendance tops 11 million for eighth consecutive year,” ncaa.com, July 6, 2015,
http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-women/article/2015-07-06/womens-basketball-attendance-tops-11-million-eighth
(accessed Mar. 17, 2016).
23

Ibid.

24

James Bowman, “Are there women's basketball programs that outdraw men's basketball?” swishappeal.com, Nov. 12,
2012 http://www.swishappeal.com/2012/11/21/3659730/ncaa-womens-basketball-attendance-mens (accessed Jan 29, 2016).
25
Chris Smith, “When It’s Okay to Lose Money” The Business of Women’s College Basketball,” forbes.com, Mar. 29,
2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/03/29/when-its-okay-to-lose-money-the-business-of-womens-collegebasketball/#6ddc6cd01a99 (accessed Apr. 5, 2016).
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American Basketball Association (1992-1995), and the American Basketball League (19961998).
Hoping to capitalize on the momentum of the U.S. Olympic women’s basketball
team’s silver medal win in the 1976 Montreal Games, Bill Byrne founded the first
professional women’s basketball league in the United States in 1978, the Women’s
Basketball League (WBL). The league was composed of eight teams―Iowa, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Dayton, Milwaukee, Chicago, New York, and Houston―each of which was
given a $50,000 team budget. The league drafted collegiate standouts such as Ann Meyers of
UCLA, but was unable to attract the number of star players it was hoping, due to unattractive
salaries, which ranged from $3,000 to $5,000 a season. The first game of the WBL was
played on December 9, 1978, between Chicago and Milwaukee in front of 8,000 fans. By the
end of the first season, the Dayton team folded.
In its second season, the WBL welcomed seven new expansion teams in Washington,
St. Louis, Philadelphia, Dallas, California, San Francisco, and New Orleans. However, as
quickly as the league expanded in its second season, it imploded in the lead up to season
three. By the end of 1980, the league had lost six teams, including its championship teams,
Houston and New York. For the players on the remaining eight teams, the third season of the
WBL was characterized by late paychecks and insignificant team budgets for meals and
travel. By the time the WBL declared bankruptcy in the summer of 1981, each of the
remaining teams had lost an average of $350,000 a year. 26
After the WBL disbanded, there was no professional women’s basketball league in
the United States for ten years. Former Continental Basketball Association commissioner,
Jim Drucker, hoped to change that when he launched the Liberty Basketball Association
26

WNBA. “History of the WBL.” WNBA.com. n.d. www.wnba.com/history (accessed Apr. 26, 2015).
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(LBA) in 1991. With its six teams―Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, New York, Los Angeles,
and a national team, the LBA All-Stars―the LBA sought to redefine the play and promotion
of women’s basketball. In an attempt to combine skill and sex appeal, the LBA’s regulations
provided for shorter courts, lowered rims, free throw lines closer to the basket, and, most
infamously, one piece, lycra unitards for its players. 27 Hoping to attract more male fans, the
league commissioned Danskin, a women’s active wear company, to design a uniform that
would accentuate players’ curves while still allowing them to run across the court. The
league’s Executive Director, Doug Verb, offered that the players the league recruited were
certainly talented, but “were lacking a certain excitement level to bring to the average sports
fan.” 28 Unfortunately for the LBA, this “certain excitement level” that they thought tighter,
body-hugging uniforms afforded and did not incentivize fans. Instead, with 10,573 fans in
attendance, the LBA played its first and only game at the Palace of Auburn Hills, Michigan
on February 18, 1991.
Established in 1992 by Lightning Mitchell, the Women’s Basketball Association
(WBA), formerly Women’s American Basketball Association (WABA), was the first
professional women’s basketball summer league. The WBA’s eight teams―Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Illinois, and Iowa―played three,
fifteen-game seasons to crowds averaging nearly 3,500 fans a game. From 1992 to 1995, the
WBA’s games were broadcasted by Liberty Sports of Dallas. The WBA, having found four
expansion teams, planned to play as a twelve team league in 1996. However, the WBA was

27

Paul Lukas, “Snug NBA All-Star jerseys aren’t a first.” Page 2:ESPN.com. Feb. 17, 2011.
http://espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=lukas/110217_liberty_basketball_association&sportCat=nba (accessed Apr. 28
2015).
28
Scripps Howard News Service, “New League Streamlined for Success,” Feb. 21, 1991
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dissolved before its fourth season by Fox Sports after the broadcasting company purchased
the league’s franchising rights. 29
Despite the disbandment of the WBA, 1996 was a banner year for women’s
basketball. The U.S. Olympic team’s gold medal win at that year’s Summer Olympics in
Atlanta marked a turning point for women’s basketball in the United States. For the first time
in sport’s history, women’s basketball was sponsored by multi-million dollar sponsors, as the
team had landmark endorsement deals with Reebok, Nike, and Gatorade. The team’s gold
medal game against Brazil was played in front of 77,000 fans, at the time an attendance
record for any women’s sport in the United States. 30 The Olympic win also sparked the
formation of two women’s basketball leagues that year, the American Basketball League
(ABL) and the WNBA.
Organized by a group of individual owners based in San Jose, California, the ABL
played its inaugural game in October 1996. With teams in Columbus, Richmond, Atlanta,
New England, Colorado, San Jose, Seattle, and Portland composed of NCAA women’s
basketball stars, the ABL was considered the first modern professional women’s basketball
league. 31 The following summer, the WNBA was launched by NBA Commissioner David
Stern, playing its first game on June 21, 1997. The WNBA’s eight teams—Charlotte,
Cleveland, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, Phoenix, Sacramento, and Utah—were all
strategically partnered with their respective city or region’s NBA team (for example, New

29

Robert Bradley ed., “The History of Women’s Professional Women’s Basketball.” The Association for Professional
Basketball Research.” n.d. http://www.apbr.org/women.html (accessed May 2, 2015).
30
Kate Fagan. “More than a dream.” espnW.com. 19 June 2012. Web. 3 May 2015.
31
James Bowman. “The 1996-97 ABL Players: Where Are They Now?.” swishappeal.com. Sept. 25, 2005,
http://www.swishappeal.com/2012/9/25/3385298/the-1996-97-abl-players-where-are-they-now (accessed Apr.27, 2015).
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York Liberty and New York Knicks) in order to encourage market support, hoping NBA fans
would support their favorite team’s “sister” squad.
The ABL and WNBA’s inaugural seasons were marked by their competition with one
another for talent and fans. The ABL was able to offer higher pay and more substantial
benefits for its players, while the NBA-sponsored WNBA had access to more high-profile
arenas and publicity. Players in the ABL made an average of $80,000 a season and were
offered year-round medical insurance and options to purchase stock in the league; WNBA
players made an average of $30,000 a season and were not provided with a benefits
package. 32 Which of the two leagues would prevail became clear as early as their first games.
Debuting in June 1997, the inaugural game of the WNBA was played in front of 14,000 fans,
almost three times that of the ABL’s debut in October of the previous year. In 1998, not even
a third of the way into its second season, the ABL filed for bankruptcy, citing over $10
million in losses.
The NBA’s sponsorship of the WNBA gave the new league advantageous access to
broader and more expensive marketing platforms compared to its predecessors and
competitor, the ABL. Since its founding in 1996 by former NBA Commissioner, David
Stern, the WNBA has been defined by both its dependence on the NBA as the league’s most
prominent benefactor and the assumed competition between the two leagues for fan and
consumer support. The NBA has played a major role in WNBA team ownership and
marketing. As Joel Litvin, former President of League Operations for the NBA stated during
a presentation at Sarah Lawrence College, “The Big Business of Professional Sports: The
Complicated Interplay Between Race, Sport, and Your Favorite Game,” “Just as a legal
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matter, the NBA owns the WNBA. It owns 50.1 percent and the owners of the individual
teams own 49.9 percent. But ultimately, because it’s our brand—the WNBA—we have to
make the decision about things like marketing the league and things like the
Logowoman 33.” 34
The most obvious representation of the relationship between the WNBA and NBA is
the pairing of WNBA teams with “brother” NBA teams. The eight original WNBA
franchises were all given a team name and logo that resembled the NBA teams they were
partnered with. The WNBA’s Charlotte Sting, Cleveland Rockers, Houston Comets, New
York Liberty, Los Angeles Sparks, Sacramento Monarchs, and Utah Starzz were marketed as
the sister squads to the NBA’s Charlotte Hornets, Cleveland Cavaliers, Houston Rockets,
New York Knicks, Los Angeles Lakers, Sacramento Kings, and Utah Jazz. The thought
behind these pairings was that the WNBA’s teams would be considered an extension of each
sponsoring NBA team’s brand, allowing the WNBA to benefit from the existing regional
markets in these areas. This was intended to generate higher revenues for the new league, as
its teams would appeal to local fans, but this has not been the case. Because of their
locations, the WNBA’s original eight teams could not capitalize on the existing markets for
women’s basketball created by storied collegiate programs such as the University of
Tennessee’s Lady Volunteers, UConn Lady Huskies, and Notre Dame Fighting Irish. With
none of the teams housed in areas where women’s college basketball reigns supreme, such as
Tennessee, Connecticut, and Indiana, the WNBA was quickly cast as the women’s auxiliary
to the men’s league. Unable to create an identity separate from the NBA, the league has
struggled to attract fans and, in turn, maintain its franchises. While all of the aforementioned
33
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NBA franchises are still in operation, only the New York Liberty and Los Angeles Sparks
remain from the WNBA’s original eight teams, and the Utah Starzz was relocated to San
Antonio, Texas in 2002. The team was renamed the San Antonio Stars, reminiscent of the
NBA’s San Antonio Spurs.
Despite providing little benefit to the league, this practice continues today, 35 and in
2015 the Tulsa Shock was relocated to Dallas, Texas and refranchised as the Dallas Wings, a
play on the NBA’s Dallas Mavericks. Despite the Shock’s improved attendance since being
moved from Detroit to Tulsa in 2010, Majority Owner Bill Cameron thought the move to the
Dallas-Fort Worth area was necessary to attract more fans and sponsors. 36 Minority Owner of
the Sparks, Stuart Price, filed suit against Cameron and argued that the choice to move the
franchise was “ripping the heart out of our children, our community, our organization, and all
of those people and organizations that have been there for the Shock, even when we were
losing.” Similarly, Tulsa Mayor Dewey Bartlett issued a public plea to Cameron and the
WNBA to keep the Shock in Tulsa. Despite the outpouring of support by fans and local
leaders, the Shock’s move was finalized in July 2015. Senior Sports Columnist for Tulsa
World, John Klein, argued that the move was reflective of the league’s larger issues,
particularly in respect to impatient owners who are “unwilling to make a serious
investment” 37 in the cities that they choose to call their team’s home. Klein asserted, “The
WNBA needs stability, not ownership that wants to move to the first small college gym that

35

See Figure 1.
Dillon Hollingsworth, “WNBA Shock Announce Plans To Leave Tulsa for Dallas, But Minority Owner Files
Suit,” Tulsa World, http://www.tulsaworld.com/sportsextra/shock/tulsa-shock-announces-plans-to-move-todallas-fort-worth/article_3f774a7d-356b-540b-8ed5-a27315a07318.html, July 21, 2015 (accessed Mar. 29,
2016).
37
John Klein “Shock failures were about the team, not Tulsa,” Tulsa World, July 21, 2015,
http://www.tulsaworld.com/homepagelatest/john-klein-shock-failures-were-about-the-team-nottulsa/article_05b21cd0-5f96-59f8-8204-97f3f4b4641d.html (accessed Mar. 29, 2016).
36

17

[FIGURE 1]

Logo for the WNBA's Los Angeles Sparks

Logo for the WNBA's Minnesota Lynx

Logo for the NBA's Los Angeles Lakers

Logo for the NBA's Minnesota Timberwolves

Logo for the WNBA's Phoenix Mercury
Logo for the NBA's Phoenix Suns

will take them.” 38 Instead of continuing to grow its existing fan base in Tulsa, the WNBA
moved it to Dallas where it could be marketed with the Dallas Mavericks. While the Shock’s
move was considered a strictly economic choice, it does reveal some of the shortcomings of
the WNBA’s approach to cultivating its fan bases.
Structuring the WNBA around NBA teams, rather than women’s basketball fans,
seems counterintuitive, and calls into question the motives behind the operation of the
league, and even its initial formation. While the U.S. Women’s Basketball team’s Olympic
win in Atlanta is often considered the catalyst for the creation of the WNBA, Jacquelyn L.
Bridgeman argues that this was not, in fact, the case, as the NBA had announced its plans for
the new women’s league before the team brought home the gold. Instead, she offers in her
chapter in Legal Issues in Professional Basketball (2011), “We Got Next: The Once and
Future WNBA,” that the NBA took measures to ensure the team’s Olympic victory, investing
over $3 million to assemble the team’s coaching staff and recruit and train players. 39
Through its financial backing of the 1996 Olympic team, the NBA was cultivating a
consumer fan base for women’s basketball. While this has led to greater visibility and
opportunity for women in athletics, the NBA’s intent was, arguably, strictly financial.
Bridegeman writes that the WNBA’s use of NBA arenas not only cut costs for the new
league, as it did not need to finance hiring and training new staff, but allowed these facilities
to garner revenue in the summer when the arenas were typically out of use, which helps
explain the strategy behind the creation of the league’s original franchises.
The NBA’s ownership of the WNBA allows it to regulate the growth of professional
women’s basketball, enabling it to maintain an almost monopolist control over the consumer
38
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market for professional basketball. With the WNBA playing in the summer, the women’s
game does not interfere with the NBA’s season, which runs from mid-October to early June,
meaning that the leagues do not need to compete over viewership and attendance. By
maintaining majority ownership over the WNBA, the NBA controls not only league
operations, such as the timing of the season, but also the image of the WNBA and its reach.
The NBA has a history of being able to effectively reinvent its image amongst American
consumers, as discussed in the next chapter, but has suspiciously and uncharacteristically
been unable to elevate the image of the WNBA and make it more popular amongst sports
fans. As one impassioned blogger, John Leach, suggests, “if the NBA wanted the WNBA to
be more popular—[it] would be.” 40
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CHAPTER TWO: The Family-Friendly Ladies of the WNBA
The screen goes black and is replaced with an image of the New York Liberty’s
starting lineup running onto the court at Madison Square Garden. Directing her message to a
presumably critical audience, the voice of four-time WNBA All-Star Swin Cash comes
through the speakers, asserting,
I know what you’re thinking. You think I can’t. You think I can’t go as hard as you.
Cross you up, and go coast to coast. 41 You think I can’t train like a beast, give it
everything I have and still be flawless. You think I can’t open doors, be legendary,
box her out 42, get her to school on time, show them I care. “D” you up. 43 Be who I
want. Love who I want. Inspire her, her and him. Take the charge. Sink the “J.” 44
Make ’em dance. You think I can’t do this, this and that? All while chasing my
dream? Watch me. 45
Described by the Phoenix Mercury’s press team as “brilliant” and “strategically and
genuinely captur[ing] everything the league is about at its core in just 60 seconds,” 46 this
television spot for the 2015 WNBA Playoffs, entitled “Watch Me,” is filled with footageof
past and present WNBA stand-outs. Cutting between videos of stars like 2015 league MVP
Elena Delle Donne working out, three-time Sixth Woman of the Year DeWanna Bonner
shooting a three, and three-time All-Star Brittney Griner dunking in her debut game, the
commercial promises performance and challenges viewers to watch as the women of the
WNBA continue to “inspire” and “chase [their] dream.” But spliced between these images
of physical prowess are shots of a two-time league MVP Candace Parker, strategically posed
naked for ESPN’s annual “Body Issue,” 47 then walking her young daughter to school. 48
Dulling the “brilliance” of the commercial and subverting Cash’s declaration of equality,
41
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Figure 2: Candace Parker's Photo Shoot for ESPN's "The
Body Issue"
Image captured from “Watch Me” Commercial

Figure 4: Candace Parker and daughter
Image captured from “Watch Me” Commercial

Figure 3: Candace Parker's Photo Shoot for ESPN's "The
Body Issue"
Image captured from “Watch Me” Commercial

Figure 5: Candace Parker walking daughter to school
Image captured from “Watch Me” Commercial

integrity, and athletic accomplishment is the reminder that the players on the screen are
women. They’re covergirls. They’re mothers. They’re friends. They’re “flawless.”
Marketing and media are the key factors that have transformed professional sports
from mere competitions between talented athletes to the billion-dollar business we recognize
today. By creating a culture of heightened consumer interest and corporate involvement,
sports marketing elevated sports into what one popular textbook on the subject describes as
“the most competitive entertainment and leisure landscape ever.” 49 Sports have now become
ubiquitous in American culture with days of the week dedicated to watching professional
football, the month of March reserved for the “madness” of collegiate basketball, athletes
endorsing everything from clothing to car insurance, and teams and leagues competing for
space in an ever more saturated and fragmented market. As consumers now have seemingly
endless opportunities to spend their time and money as sports spectators, teams and leagues
must compete against each other for the attention and loyalty of fans. The cultivation of
sustainable sports leagues has come to depend on marketing campaigns that can not only
create fans, but also encourage them to buy tickets and team apparel.
Economist Roger D. Blair argues in Sports Economics that a key factor in fans’
attraction to a particular team is the team’s record; as “winning leads to more fans and greater
attendance; athletic performance improves economic performance—that is, profit, of the
team.” 50 In turn, Blair observes, winning records and high-level performance by athletes are
rewarded with bonuses and salary increases. Bearing this in mind, how can one explain the
deep disparity in pay between players of the winning-most Liberty and poor performing
Knicks?
49
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In the 2015 season, the Liberty went 23-11 (0.676) in the regular season and 3-3 in
the postseason, after entering the playoffs as the number one team in their conference. In the
2014-2015 season, the Knicks went 17-65 (.207) in the regular season and did not qualify for
the postseason playoffs. Having the most losses in franchise history, the Knicks finished
fifteenth out of fifteen teams in their conference. In the same unprecedentedly unsuccessful
season, the highest paid player on the Knicks’ roster, forward Carmelo Anthony, was paid
$22,458,401, 51 nearly twenty-five times more than the Liberty’s team salary cap of $901,000
and almost 212 times more than the most highly compensated players on the Liberty, Tina
Charles and Swin Cash’s, each of whom is paid $106,000 per season. The lowest-paid Knick,
former power forward Travis Wear, got $507,336, 52 nearly fifty-six percent of the Liberty’s
team salary cap. Since 2000, the Knicks have spent $1.3 billion on the player payroll, the
highest in the NBA, but have only made four playoff appearances. In fact, according to
financial analyst Sreekar Jasthi, the Knicks are the “least-efficient spenders” 53 of all
franchises in professional football, baseball, and basketball—America’s most prominent
sports leagues.
Despite its historic losses, the Knicks remain one of the most celebrated and avidly
supported teams amongst NBA fans, which explains how the franchise can still issue
exorbitant salaries to its stars. In the 2014-2015 season, the Knicks ranked fourth in fan
attendance out of the NBA’s thirty teams, with a total of 812,292 fans at home games—an
average of 19, 812 per game. 54 That was more than double the Liberty’s average
51
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attendance—just 9,159 fans per game in the 2015 season. 55 Strategically designed
advertising and other forms of promotion have the potential to increase fans’ willingness to
pay to watch their favorite professional team in person, 56 and as the Knicks’ season
attendance suggests, divert attention away from poor performance.
According to sports marketing scholar Matthew D. Shank, teams are able to create a
“distinct” identity and “directly” affect consumer behavior by building a specific marketing
narrative and brand. In the case of the WNBA and New York Liberty, the “distinct” identity
that is formed through the team and league’s marketing efforts often upholds traditional
female gender roles and position players as “family friendly” and feminine.
The marketing strategy seen in the “Watch Me” commercial—depicting the women
of the WNBA as not only players, but also as pillars of their homes and communities— is not
new to the league. Instead, this approach dates back to the WNBA’s inaugural 1997
campaign, “We Got Next.” In 1997, the women of the WNBA declared, “We Got Next,” a
nod to male pickup game culture, proclaiming that it was their turn to play basketball
professionally in the United States. This newest attempt to found an American professional
basketball league for women coincided not only with the U.S. Olympic Women’s Team’s
gold-medal finish at the 1996 Atlanta Games but also with a federal court’s ruling in the case
Cohen v. Brown University (1993), that Title IX requires “full and effective accommodation
of women in collegiate athletics.” 57 Highlighting an increase in women’s participation in
athletics, these developments increased the numbers of fans of women’s sports.
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In her article, “‘We Got Next’: The WNBA Advertising Campaign’s Negotiations
with ‘Femininity,’” media studies scholar Kara Keeling notes, that the “We Got Next”
campaign “stands as the most visible (and most expensive) of the serious attempts to foster a
market for professional women’s basketball.” 58 Largely funded by the NBA, the $15-million
campaign included print ads, billboards, television commercials, and marquee banners at
NBA games. In a1997 article for the Wall Street Journal on the league’s inaugural season,
“With Big Sponsors and TV Deal, WNBA Seeks a Niche With Fans,” Roger Thurow
offered, “If that orange-and-oatmeal [WNBA] ball doesn’t bounce across your radar screen
sometime this summer—you are either totally unplugged or vacationing on the moon. For the
NBA isn’t merely launching a new sports venture. It is unleashing a marketing monster.” 59
The “We Got Next” campaign and the television broadcasting of the inaugural season
were vital to the cultivation of a WNBA fan base and, subsequently, the success of the
league. However, as seen in the “Watch Me” ad, familiar images of femininity could be
found in the campaign’s most prominent ads. “Sisters are Doing it for Themselves,” a 1985
duet by The Eurhythmics and Aretha Franklin, served as the theme song for NBC’s
commercials promoting the inaugural game between the New York Liberty and Los Angeles
Sparks. As players showcased their skills on the screen, the song proclaimed, “We’re coming
out of the kitchen, so there’s something we gotta say to you. Sisters are doing it for
themselves.” 60 League commercials such as “The Runway” and “A Woman’s Work,”
projected a similar narrative―seemingly rejecting the restraints of gender roles, but
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celebrating a balance between athleticism and conventional femininity. Featuring WNBA
star Lisa Leslie and two team members, “The Runway” showcased players in full-face
makeup sauntering down a fashion runway towards a locker room, presumably to dress for
that night’s game, while the “A Woman’s Work” ad featured quick shots of women playing
basketball, closing with the adage, “Women’s work never ends.” 61 By likening WNBA
players to models and suggesting they went from the kitchen to the court, these commercials
reminded audiences that, while these women were playing a fast-paced and competitive
sport, they were still women doing “women’s work.” In short, the “We Got Next” campaign
sought to placate the anxiety over the association of female athleticism with mannishness and
lesbianism, and by doing so, reinforced the hegemonic gender norms that already burdened
the public perception of the league.
Because women’s athletics challenges gender norms, the WNBA is put in a
precarious position when marketing the league. The push-and-pull nature of the league’s and
its players’ negotiations with traditional views of gender is seen throughout the WNBA and
its teams’ marketing efforts even today—twenty years after the league’s inaugural season.
Consider, for example, the differences between the New York Liberty’s and New
York Knicks’ marketing materials for season tickets. The front cover of the Liberty
pamphlet 62 features the team’s logo at the center, a photo of center Tina Charles (player #31)
at the top left, and a photo of former point guard Cappie Poindexter (player #23) 63 in the
bottom right corner. The bottom left reads, “Nothing divides our team, or our fans. When the
Liberty plays, the Garden is a family. We stand for Liberty[.]” The top half of the back
61
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cover 64 features a picture of Poindexter making a jump shot in a game against the
Washington Mystics, a picture of a section of children from The Park Slope Day Camp
cheering on the Liberty, and the slogan “WE STAND FOR LIBERTY.” The bottom half of
the guide is a season ticket order form that includes contact information for the Liberty.
At first glance, the five images and few lines of text on the covers of this season ticket
guide seem simple and straightforward; the team wants you to buy tickets and to “Stand for
Liberty.” However, the pamphlet conveys a more specific narrative to consumers; the Liberty
is worth watching because it is a family-friendly team. As stated on the front cover, the
women of the Liberty can transform the fans of Madison Square Garden into a family, so
much so, that the season ticket office email address, found on the pamphlet’s back cover, is
LibertyFamily@msg.com. This reference to family is not unusual. As Matthew Shank notes,
family, along with achievement, success, and youthfulness, is one of the core values
“continuously stressed” 65 by American sports marketers. The problem is that the Liberty, like
many other teams in the WNBA, relies almost exclusively on marketing that stresses family,
which appeals to a limited segment of sports consumers.
The pamphlet also suggests the Liberty marketing assumes the target audience lacks
interest in or knowledge of the team. The image of the Brooklyn campers is blurry, and one
of the young campers is grimacing, looking away from the camera. This suggests that
showing children at a game was more of a priority than the actual quality of the picture. Even
more revealing is that the pamphlet is clearly outdated. This particular advertisement was
distributed in June 2015, nearly two weeks into that year’s season, yet it features a
photograph of Cappie Poindexter, whom the Liberty traded in February 2015. The inclusion
64
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of Poindexter’s image four months after her departure from the team suggests a shockingly
low standard for the team marketing materials, and an assumption that her absence from the
roster would most likely go unnoticed by the majority of consumers.
By focusing on the family in its advertisements, the Liberty and WNBA put
themselves and their consumers in a box. Because the WNBA anticipates that it is a league
that is most attractive to families, it directs most of its advertising efforts to this demographic
group and, unfortunately, succumbs to the characterization of the league as a “niche” sport
that only appeals to a family-focused consumer base. This “family” market is primarily
composed of women and children and is specifically concerned with affordability and
“family friendliness,” which requires that the Liberty’s players seem accessible and relatable
and, most important, compliant with traditional gender roles.
The Liberty season ticket pamphlet presents the value of the team as deriving from
their ability to bring people together, not in their ability to play. This stands in stark contrast
to the sense of value created for the Knicks by its season ticket ad. 66 Featuring action shots
of forward Jerian Grant (#13), forward Carmelo Anthony (#7), and forward-center Kristaps
Porzingis (#46) and reading, “No Place Like the Garden[.] Secure Your Season Tickets,” this
marketing presents that Knicks as a high-performing team whose tickets are highly sought
after. The use of the word “secure” in its prompt to get fans to purchase season tickets creates
a sense that there is a risk that these tickets will run out. Though this is not the case, it creates
a sense of high demand for Knicks’ tickets and, in turn, suggests that the Knicks are of high
value, exemplifying the team’s ability to create a brand identity that is independent from and,
arguably, indifferent to the team’s actual performance.
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Figure 6: Liberty 2015 Season Ticket Pamphlet Front Cover

Figure 7: Liberty 2015 Season Ticket Pamphlet Back Cover

Figure 8: Knicks 2015-2016 Season Ticket Ad

The differing images on these season ticket advertisements and the messages they
convey to consumers fall in line with traditional views of gender as seen in athletics. While
Grant, Anthony, and Porzingis are pictured sweating on the court during a game, Charles and
Poindexter are seen posed with their hair done and minimal, but noticeable, makeup on.
Grant, Anthony, and Porzingis have their “game faces” on, looking up at the goal as they
prepare to take a shot or looking at a defender as they try to secure the ball, while Charles
and Poindexter offer warm and welcoming smiles.
The WNBA’s presenting itself as a family-focused league can, arguably, be
considered a direct response to the “bad boy” reputation of the NBA and its players.
Historically, basketball has been seen as a sport for wayward boys. Dr. James Naismith
created the sport in 1981 as a way to keep the boys of the YMCA occupied and out of trouble
on the days that the weather would not permit them to play outside. In his 1896 essay for
Spalding’s guide for basketball, “Ethics of Basketball,” Dr. Luther Gulick argued that “the
greatest danger” presented during play was not injury, but male players’ conducting
themselves in an “ungentlemanly [and] discourteous” 67 manner. Gulick concluded by
offering, “Sport which violates the principles of courtesy and good character is never good
sport.” Echoing this sentiment, William H. Bail argued that the success of men’s basketball
was dependent on the “intense desire” 68 of Naismith and coaches to reject the objectionably
brute verbal and physical retaliation incited by losses or calls that players believed were
unfair. This characterization of basketball being a sport that potentially jeopardizes players’
behavior on and off the court has remained.
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From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, around the same time of the WNBA’s first
seasons, a number of drug scandals and assault charges amongst NBA stars like eleven-time
NBA All-Star Charles Barkley, five-time NBA Champion Dennis Rodman, and ten-time
NBA All-Star Jason Kidd, made the reputation of the NBA plummet in the eyes of the
American public, and the league was referred to as the “National Brawlers’ Association.” In
what became known as “Malice at the Palace,” in November 2004, a fight broke out between
players for the Indiana Pacers and Detroit Pistons, eventually leading to player Ron Artest
assaulting a fan. As a response to the actions of its players, the NBA established “NBA
Cares,” which focused on players’ community service and volunteer endeavors. With the
creation of the WNBA, “WNBA Cares” was established, and what started as an effort at
image repositioning in the NBA had become a vital aspect of the WNBA brand.
While the WNBA has tried to market itself as the wholesome alternative to the NBA,
it takes for granted that the scandalous behavior of NBA players actually adds to the league’s
fan appeal. As Todd Boyd argues in Young, Black, Rich & Famous: The Rise of the NBA, the
Hip Hop Invasion, and the Transformation of American Culture, the lifestyle of NBA players
has not only caused fans to double down on their interest and commitment to the league, but
has created a new idealized lifestyle. Boyd argues that the “internationally known, nationally
recognized, and locally accepted” 69 image of the NBA and its players has ushered in “a new
American dream,” one that focuses on lavish wealth and behavior.
Aside from the entertainment and economic value of sports, fans are motivated to
watch or attend sporting events because of the escape from the mundane it provides. Both
Shank and Blair cite diversion from everyday life and the psychological phenomenon known
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as BIRGing—basking in reflected glory, 70 as key factors influencing sports consumption.
Since the WNBA’s focus on the family makes their players more relatable to the league’s
targeted demographics, it serves more as a reflection of everyday life, and does not project
the excitement that the majority of sports fans—upper-income men—find attractive. With the
acceptance and celebration of the unruliness of some of the biggest names in the NBA, the
WNBA’s promotion of its good-natured principles is unlikely to attract these consumers.
This focus has, in fact, had adverse effects on the WNBA, not only limiting its appeal to a
more widespread fan base, but also reinforcing the WNBA’s characterization as a downmarket alternative to the NBA and detracting attention from the issues of player pay.
In her 2015 essay for The Player’s Tribune, “(In)Visibility,” WNBA star Maya
Moore wrote about the challenges and frustrations of transitioning from the highly celebrated
world of college basketball to a professional level that is marked by “Less coverage. Empty
seats. Fewer eyeballs.” 71 Moore offered that the league needs to revamp its marketing in
order to give women’s basketball the platform its players have earned:
Our own marketing is something that needs to improve, no question. Every player in
the league knows this. The marketing needs to match our product. There should be
more time and effort spent celebrating the basketball…I don’t want to compromise
our identity as basketball players to become something that we think people will like
on a superficial level. Celebrate us for the things that matter—the stories, the
basketball, the character, the fiery competitiveness, our professionalism. 72
As Moore observes, the league’s current approach to marketing is only attracting fans on a
“superficial” level that compromises the skills and identity of its players.
Because of the superficiality of its marketing narrative, the WNBA is unable to attract
fans on a widespread level and, in turn, generate increased revenue. Despite this, however,
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the league continues to insist on focusing on the gender of its players, rather than their
athletic ability. When asked about her plans to revamp the WNBA’s marketing, the league’s
new president, Lisa Borders offered, “We’re going to start marketing individuals, on and off
the court. When you think about athletes in general, we marvel at how fast they can run, how
high they can jump, and we tend to forget that they are people too and they have real lives.
They have children, they have dogs, and they have interests beyond the court. It might be
fashion, hair, makeup, or whatever it is.” 73 Borders takes for granted that a major problem
the WNBA faces is that fans do not “marvel” at the athletic prowess of its players, and her
plan to focus more on sharing the stories of players’ home lives only perpetuates the family
narrative that WNBA marketing is already marked by. Borders’s focus on players’ interests
in fashion is problematic but not surprising. Instead, it reiterates the gendered ideologies that
the WNBA’s administration are guided by, and it is quite telling that the only outside
interests of WNBA players that Border lists are hobbies that promote traditional images of
femininity.
What has emerged from this wholesome imaging of the WNBA is what can be
described as a “sacrifice narrative.” The players of the WNBA have been cast as selfless,
family-friendly women who are more interested in playing the sport they love and
entertaining their faithful fans than in taking home an impressive pay check—willing to
sacrifice personal gains for the betterment of the sport. Juliette Terzieff, author of Women of
the Court: Inside the WNBA argues that the commitment of WNBA players, in spite of their
low salaries, is a testament to their loyalty to and love of the game. Terzieff minimizes the
financial needs of the WNBA and its players, noting “No fancy equipment is needed; no
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special training; just passion, passion, and more passion.” 74 Similarly in Why She Plays: The
World of Women’s Basketball, Christine Baker argues that the low salaries WNBA players
earn is actually good for their game and the league; with fewer perks and accommodations,
WNBA players are able to focus their energy on playing basketball, and their “sacrifice will
ensure the league’s longevity.” Baker continues, “The key is the women of the WNBA don’t
complain.” 75
The sentiments of Terzieff and Baker are echoed by writers for major sports
publications such as Sport Illustrated and ESPN.com. In their article “The Case for...The
WNBA,” Andrew Lawrence and Ted Keith offer that WNBA players are “mold-shattering
women…[who] should be an inspiration to us all.” 76 Their “case” for the league does not
include the athletic talents of the WNBA’s players. Similarly, Michael Buteau of
Businessweek commends WNBA owners for “making history, not profits,” and describes
playing in the WNBA as an opportunity for “soul-searching,” 77 empowering women, and
providing role models for young girls. While all of this is true, the WNBA also represents an
opportunity for women to play basketball and, more important, get paid to play at the
professional level. Lawrence, Leith, and Buteau offer an almost romanticized version of life
for WNBA players, and ignore the effects of their low wages not only on their personal lives,
but also on the future of the league.
This narrative of self-sacrifice has been adopted by players in the league. When asked
about pay inequity between the WNBA and NBA in a 2013 interview for Sway in the
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Morning, Skylar Diggind, guard for the Dallas Wings, told host Sway Calloway, “I mean, I
agree, but I think that if you play for the money, you shouldn’t be playing. I think it’s about
the love for the game and the passion. That’s why I play.” 78 Not only does this sentiment cast
players who aspire to earn higher wages from playing as disloyal to the league; it also
perpetuates the gendered narrative that the marketing of the league has become characterized
by.
This sacrifice narrative and the characterization of the WNBA as a “family-friendly,”
down-market alternative to the NBA not only maintains low wages in the league, but
celebrates them. Some players like Moore have publicly resisted this gendered narrative, but
the WNBA has yet to answer their call for the league to focus on what matters, “the stories,
the basketball, the character, the fiery competitiveness, [their] professionalism.”
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CHAPTER THREE
“Spin Moves”: The Marketing Maneuvers of the WNBA
When asked about the challenges of making the WNBA and its players more
marketable, league stylist Rachel Johnson answered, “From a sports perspective, these
women holler, scream, sweat and aren't posing when they play, so they aren't going to look
their best….It's not easy to be a woman in that place.” 79 Johnson’s response concisely
captures the image constraints that the WNBA and its players are burdened by. It is hard
being a woman in “that place,” because that place is not simply the arenas or locker rooms
that WNBA players call home. Instead, “that place” is the product of the sports-media
complex—the collective consciousness of sports journalists, broadcasters, fans, and the
general consuming public—where players are examined and scrutinized for their adherence
to traditional gender norms. At the same time, they are also being assessed by their ability to
play, which, in turn, challenges said norms. Despite the unladylike screaming and hollering
that Johnson speaks of, New York Times sportswriter William C. Rhoden suggests that these
image constraints have left the WNBA as “maybe the quietest sports league in the United
States.” 80 Because the league’s successes fly so under the radar, so do its failures, and the
WNBA is able to spin the challenges the league and its players face—namely, the league’s
resistance to recognizing its LGBT fans and the growing problem of overseas play in the offseason.
Describing the fan base that the league fostered in its first few seasons, former
WNBA President Val Ackerman, stated, “We have created a new audience for the sport of
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basketball with the WNBA. We have created it from scratch. These are fans that may not,
and in most cases, do not, support men’s professional sports.” 81 In a very roundabout way,
Ackerman hinted that the WNBA’s central fan base was composed of lesbians. This skirting
around the fact that the WNBA attracted members of the LGBT community persisted, much
to the dismay and frustration of these fans. In 2002, a group self-described as “Lesbians for
Liberty” staged a “kiss-in” during the televised New York Liberty versus Miami Sol game at
Madison Square Garden, as a means of protesting the Liberty’s lack of acknowledgment and
promotion of its strong lesbian fan base. According to a report by The South Florida SunSentinel, lesbians made up thirty percent of the WNBA’s fan base at the time, 82 but the
league did not actively recognize the group in its teams’ promotions and appearances. The
Lesbians for Liberty call to action asked, “Are you tired of the WNBA and the New York
Liberty denying that lesbians are packing Madison Square Garden week after week for
women's basketball games?” 83 Liberty administration responded to the kiss-in with a
placating statement that described the WNBA as “an environment where every single
person—regardless of age, ethnicity or sexual preference— is treated equally.” 84 The
message, however, did not celebrate the fact that LGBT fans were part of the WNBA
community. Instead, it suggested that the WNBA was a league for everyone, including the
straight male fans of men’s sports. It would take over a decade for the league to finally
respond in a substantial and meaningful way to the frustration of these and other LGBT fans,
by launching its annual WNBA Pride Night in 2014.
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The initiative made the WNBA the first professional sports league to specifically
target and recruit lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender fans, but, for many league
supporters, WNBA Pride was much overdue. Rick Welts, the executive vice president and
chief marketing officer of the NBA when the WNBA was created, “We guessed very wrong
on that…. I remember sitting in a few meetings where we had really interesting thoughtful
discussions of: ‘Should we be proactive marketing to the LGBT community? What does that
say if we do?’ We certainly didn't want to position the league of being exclusionary to
anyone. What were we saying if we did it more proactively? Society and sports culture is
very different today than it was back then. Teams were trying to figure out the right thing to
do.” 85
While many believe that the growing number of WNBA players coming out as gay
prompted the league to embrace its LGBT fans, Tom Van Riper of Forbes.com suggests that
the Pride initiative seems more like a last-ditch effort by the league to cultivate a more
sustainable fan base than an act rooted in a sense of social responsibility. Van Riper writes,
“The WNBA resisted for as long as it could. But with few options left to shake up its
struggling league, it’s going where it never really wanted to—as the specific go-to place for
gay fans.” 86 Reminiscent of the concerns Welts cites, Van Riper argues that the WNBA is
“embarking on a strategy to rally the base, rather than broaden it.” 87
The league’s inability to attract larger fan bases and maintain those that it has already
established has had consistently adverse effects on players’ pay. In what one sports journalist
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has referred to as the “dirty little secret of the WNBA,” 88 increasing numbers of players have
resorted to playing year-round, spending their summers at home playing for the WNBA and
their winters playing overseas, in order to supplement their pay. In the 2015 off-season
seventy-seven of the WNBA’s 147 players played for fifty-two international teams, the
majority of which belong to the International Basketball Federation’s EuroLeague Women
(FIBAW). Founded in September 1958, FIBAW is the premier professional league for
women’s basketball in Europe. 89 Since 1991, thirty of FIBAW’s scoring leaders have been
American, twenty-four of these since the emergence of the WNBA in 1997. 90
While WNBA players’ salaries are capped at $107,500 after a minimum of six
seasons with the league, FIBAW players make upwards of $1 million a season, as the
majority of international clubs are sponsored by local businesses, municipal governments,
and wealthy team owners who prioritize player pay over all other expenses. Aside from these
higher salaries, players also enjoy travel perks not yet offered by the WNBA, such as private
jets, five-star hotel suites, and privately-catered meals. Their accommodations during the
season often include lofty apartments, personal drivers and translators, and extravagant gifts.
Unlike the WNBA, international teams such as Russia’s Ekaterinburg, China’s
Zheijang, and the Czech Republic’s USK Praha do not televise their games nationally, and
typically average only 1,000 attendants at a game. Even a quick glance at the websites of
FIBAW and WNBA teams reveals stark differences between their marketing strategies. The
only pictures on the FIBAW team websites are live-action player shots, team photos, and
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photos of coaches and staff; there is no “In the Community” section that highlights players’
philanthropic efforts when they are off the court, as found on the Liberty’s and other WNBA
teams’ websites. The “History” recounted on the FIBAW teams’ sites includes only notable
wins, while the WNBA’s sites include the history of women’s basketball in the United States,
team wins, league development, and changes to coaching and operational staff.
The perks of playing overseas often come at the expense of players’ health. In 2011,
the WNBA’s season started with two of the league’s star players, the Los Angeles Sparks’
Candace Parker and Seattle Storm’s Lauren Jackson, having to sit out with injuries sustained
shortly after returning from their seasons abroad. Untimely injuries like Parker’s and
Jackson’s are not uncommon in the WNBA, however, and, for many players in the league,
are not enough to deter them from returning to play overseas. In an interview with Melissa
Rohlin of The Los Angeles Times, Sparks guard Ticha Penicheiro said, “Physically, mentally,
it's a lot of sacrifices to make….I've been doing it 13 years. Sometimes you play with
injuries, but you never have time to recover. It's like you're always playing hurt.” 91 Echoing
these sentiments, Courtney Watson, trainer for the Sparks, offered, “If there was a little more
resting time in between [the FIBAW and WNBA seasons], we wouldn't see half as many of
the injuries we see now.” 92
In an attempt to spin this unfortunate truth that players are playing year-round at the
risk of burnout and premature retirement, and that the perks of playing in the WNBA pale in
comparison to those available overseas, the WNBA annually publishes “WNBA Players
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Playing Overseas” on its website. The page serves as a way of updating fans on the
happenings of their favorite players in the off-season. It reads:
When the WNBA season wraps up that doesn’t mean the basketball stops. Plenty of
players across the league head overseas to continue playing. Fresh off a WNBA
championship and a WNBA Finals MVP honor, Sylvia Fowles is playing in the
Women’s Chinese Basketball Association. Indiana’s Marissa Coleman is playing for
Turkish team Fenerbahçe. Reigning Rookie of the Year Jewell Loyd is starring for
Galatasaray. And those are just a few. Take a look at where your favorite WNBA
stars are playing overseas below. 93
The message’s nonchalant tone and use of “fresh off” is quite telling. While the WNBA
recognizes that its players are getting very little time to recuperate after the summer season
ends, they are able to spin concern for a player’s health and well-being into a narrative of
perseverance, a variation of the sacrifice narrative. By failing to address the fact that players
go overseas to earn higher pay, the WNBA suggests that its players are willing to sacrifice
their bodies to yearlong play so that the conclusion of the WNBA’s season “doesn’t mean the
basketball stops.” Instead, fans can enjoy the game they love yearlong.
After spending the majority of their off-season playing basketball in a foreign county,
the women of the WNBA return in the summer to a league seemingly indifferent to the low
salaries that send them abroad. As WNBA players’ experiences in FIBAW reveal, the pay
disparity between the WNBA and NBA cannot just be written off as the result of weak
consumer support for the women’s league. This weak support is, instead, the result of a
system in which players’ appeal is limited by the same league investors and administration
that do not prioritize their pay.
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Sports Illustrated writer L. Jon Wertheim offers that the “fun-house-mirror
economics of women’s pro basketball” 94 in the United States will lead the league’s top
players into the welcoming arms of teams abroad on a more permanent basis. This looming
risk came to realization in February 2015, when Diana Taurasi, star of the Phoenix Mercury,
announced that she would sit out for the 2015 season at the request of her Russian Premier
League team. Since being drafted in 2004, Taurasi has played year-round, every year—
summers with the WNBA and winters overseas. Sportswriter Kate Fagan projects that this
“forced existence of a professional women’s basketball player” 95 could lead to the downfall
of the WNBA. Taurasi spoke about her decision to sit out in a 2015 interview for Grantland.
When asked by host Jalen Rose about Taurasi making ninety-nine percent of her $1.6 million
annual income overseas, Taurasi responded:
I mean, it’s just, people always ask me this question. It’s like, okay. Messi goes to
Barcelona to play soccer. Does he go to Argentina and play for the, you know,
recreational league during the summer? No. So why, why have we been put in a
position to do that? And I know it’s different. You know, Europe is different. Free
market. You know, you got all these billionaires who just love it. They’re not doing it
for profit, they’re not doing it for media. You know, it’s just like one rich Russian
who loves basketball, and pays you a lot of money. You’re like the hired assassin.
And you know, the WNBA is trying to be a league of longevity. We’re near nineteen
[years], hopefully it gets to 40. And, you know, it’s just been a little bit of a crawl
lately, and I think it needs to start running a little bit. 96
Taurasi’s comparison of the WNBA to a recreational league is a characterization that
naysayers have used to denigrate the league. But coming from 2004 first overall draft pick,
three-time WNBA Champion, and seven-time WNBA All-Star Taurasi, the comparison
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suggests a certain level of player frustration with the league that is rarely revealed. Taurasi is
the first marquee player in the league’s history to sit out from the WNBA at the request of an
international squad, but the consistently low wages offered by the league suggest that she
will not be the last.
Another aspect of the Taurasi interview that is very telling is her self-characterization
as a “hired assassin.” While the interview focuses on how the WNBA’s goal of league
longevity is pursued at the expense of player pay, Taurasi’s brief self-description, when
analyzed further, provides insight into what life is like for WNBA players abroad. These
players are contracted by international teams for very limited amounts of time and for a very
specific purpose—to win.
While they are financially supported, their time abroad can subject them to many
personal challenges. In 2013, in a day-in-the-life video for WNBA.com, “Candace Parker’s
Life in Russia,” the two-time WNBA MVP talked about raising her three year old daughter,
Lailaaa, while playing in the off-season for Russia’s UMMC Ekaterinburg. Parker says:
I’ve been in “mommy mode” since I’ve been professional, but it’s tough in a foreign
country. I don’t have a lot of help, so its Lailaa and I.…I think we’re starting to get
the culture. When I first came here [in 2010], I had a six-month-old, so it was just
survival mode. I think my biggest concern coming over was the sacrifice—not only
that I was making, but my family was making. You know, mainly my daughter. It’s
really tough to be separated from my husband and Lailaa not to be able to see her dad
everyday on a consistent basis. I think we’re looking at it as a short-term thing. You
know—basketball, overseas, our playing careers. It’s not going to last forever and this
is a great opportunity for our family. For everything we’re giving up from being over
here, we’re gaining that much more. 97
Stories like Parker’s can be told throughout the league by players whose hands are practically
forced by the financial promise of playing overseas that the WNBA cannot yet match. These
stories of “sacrifice” and “survival mode” are not the ones conveyed by the league when it
97
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highlights off-season play. More concerning, as Parker’s video reveals, is that this lifestyle
challenges and disrupts the family structure that the WNBA so tightly clings to in its
marketing narrative. This suggests that the image of these players that the league projects is a
greater priority than their financial and personal well-being.
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CONCLUSION
As Brittney Griner neared the end of her senior season with the Baylor Lady Bears,
her post-college career plans became a topic of national conversation. Named the Wade
Trophy Player of the Year in 2012 and 2013, Griner helped reinvigorate the women’s game
and set a new standard for collegiate players everywhere. In 2012, the six-foot, eight-inch
center led her team to the NCAA Division I Women’s Basketball Championship and a 40-0
season, making Baylor the first college basketball team—women’s or men’s—to finish with
a perfect record. In her four years as a Lady Bear, Griner scored 3,283 career points, blocked
748 shots, and reestablished the dunk in women’s basketball with eleven in her senior season
alone, 98 catching the attention of sports pundits across the country.
One of Griner’s most prominent supporters was the owner of the NBA’s Dallas
Mavericks, Mark Cuban. In a pre-game interview in April 2013, Cuban remarked that he
would have “no problem whatsoever” 99 picking Griner during the second round of that year’s
NBA draft or having her try out for the team’s Summer League. Griner responded via
Twitter, “I would hold my own! Let’s do it,” 100 but her tryout never materialized. On May
13, Griner was selected by the Phoenix Mercury as the top overall pick of the 2013 WNBA
Draft, and went on to make $49,440 in her rookie season 101—about one-tenth of what Mike
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Muscala, the player whom the Mavs did select in the second round, was guaranteed under the
NBA’s 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Later that year, Griner was selected
by the Women’s Chinese Basketball Association’s (WCBA) Zhejiang Golden Bulls to play
in the WNBA’s off-season, for which she was paid $600,000. 102 Griner’s contract with the
WCBA brought her total earnings for the year to less than eight percent of the top overall
pick of the 2013 NBA Draft, Anthony Bennett, under his $8.5 million annual contract with
the Cleveland Cavaliers. 103 Today a WNBA Champion and three-time WNBA All-Star,
Griner’s makes a living as do many other players in the league—by splitting her time
between her WNBA team and the international squad she plays for in the off-season to help
supplement her pay.
While the firestorm that surrounded Griner’s potential draft by the NBA was shortlived, it did spark conversations on the future of professional basketball, namely whether or
not women could or should play for the NBA. Many argued that Cuban’s offer was insincere
and was simply a means of turning attention away from the Mavericks’ lackluster season.
Kelly Dwyer of Yahoo! Sports described Griner as “a once-in-a-generation athlete,” 104 but
concluded that she still would not be able to play in the NBA, as her size and skill made her
comparable to only the league’s most mediocre players. Even Geno Auriemma, storied coach
of the UConn Lady Huskies who has publicly referred to the men’s game as “a joke,” 105
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spoke out against Griner’s playing for the NBA, offering, “I think it would be a sham. The
[idea] that a woman could actually play right now in the NBA and compete successfully
against the level of play that they have is absolutely ludicrous.” 106 With prominent
proponents of women’s basketball such as Auriemma coming out against a woman’s
potential to play in the NBA, the idea of a co-ed professional basketball league was written
off as laughable.
In response to the criticism his remarks received, Cuban asserted, “Nothing harms an
organization or company more than a closed mind.” 107 Regardless of Cuban’s intent in
extending his informal invitation to Griner, truer words could not have been spoken of the
biggest burden facing the WNBA and its players. Guided by a steadfast loyalty to traditional
views of femininity, the league’s marketing conveys a close-minded narrative, one that paints
players as mothers, and sisters, and friends before bringing attention to, let alone showcasing,
their athletic abilities. This, in turn, only reinforces the idea that it is “ludicrous” to see such
ladies playing for the NBA, or any professional basketball teams for that matter, and
continues to stunt the image of the WNBA amongst general sports consumers. The WNBA is
no closer to parity with the NBA than it was twenty years ago when the new league first
declared “We Got Next.” As the NBA season becomes longer and player salaries reach
unprecedented heights, the WNBA still struggles to find and maintain a fan base, secure
endorsement deals for its players, and offer competitive wages—problems that cannot simply
be written off as effects of the league’s youth or shortened season. What does it mean that a
league that touts itself as the “the home for the best women’s basketball talent in the
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world” 108 is unable to convey this message of greatness to consumers? And, moreover, what
are the implications of the fact that the perceived pinnacle for women basketball players in
the United States is not playing for the WNBA, but, instead, its male counterpart, something
that has been described as inconceivable?
On March 30, 2016, five soccer players of the United States Women’s National Team
(USWNT)—Alex Morgan, Becky Sauerbrunn, Carli Lloyd, Hope Solo, and Megan
Rapinoe—filed a wage discrimination lawsuit with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) against the U.S. Soccer Federation. Citing unequal salaries and travel
stipends in comparison to those of their male counterpart, the United States Men’s National
Team (USMNT), the team’s complaint seeks to reevaluate the USWNT’s Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Above all, the women say that they are seeking “equality,
respect, and equal pay.” 109 With their options seemingly limited—barred from playing for the
NBA and compelled to play overseas in the off-season—will WNBA players be the next
professional women athletes to seek legal remedies for their low wages?
Sixteen-year soccer veteran Hope Solo says that her team’s fight for equal wages is
not an isolated incident, offering, “We’ve been brainwashed as women to not stand up for
equal pay with men. It’s not just in sports; it’s in every workforce for all women.” 110With the
world looking on as the USWNT’s case unfolds, the relationship between men’s and
women’s professional sports will continue to exemplify the extensive reach and effects of
pay inequity, and will provide for new ways of understanding reasons for the gender gap in
wages and its social and cultural implications.
108

WNBA “History,” WNBA.com, n.d. wnba.com/history (accessed Feb. 20, 2016).
Allison Glock, “The Conversation with USWNT players Alex Morgan, Becky Sauerbrunn, Carli Lloyd and
Hope Solo,” espnW.com, Apr. 1, 2016, http://espn.go.com/espnw/voices/article/15100708/the-conversationuswnt-players-alex-morgan-becky-sauerbrunn-carli-lloyd-hope-solo, (accessed Apr. 15, 2016).
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